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 GILBURT LOESCHER
 University of Notre Dame
 JOHN SCANLAN
 Indiana University Law School at Bloomington
 HUMAN RIGHTS, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY,
 AND HAITIAN REFUGEES
 Haitians have been migrating to the United States in signifi-
 cant numbers since the rise to power of Francois Duvalier over a
 quarter century ago. A few who have been able to meet the strict
 eligibility criteria of U. S. immigration law have entered as legal
 immigrants. Perhaps as many as 300,000 others have entered
 illegally, or have overstayed the terms of their temporary visas. A
 diverse population composed of professionals and businessmen,
 students and shopkeepers, journalists, small land holders, and
 illiterate peasants, it is impossible to capture their individual
 reasons for leaving Haiti and coming to the United States in a
 single all-inclusive phrase.
 Haiti is the poorest country in this hemisphere. Nearly all who
 leave to come to the United States are aware that they are trading
 malnutrition, negligible educational opportunities, and a sub-
 sistence standard of living for the greater opportunities afforded
 by life in America. Haiti is also a country with a tradition of
 violence and political repression that is unparalleled in the
 Caribbean. The violence is less extreme today than it was in the
 darkest days of Francois Duvalier's rule, yet the national security
 forces continue to carry on personal vendettas in the countryside,
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 and political repression has not abated significantly. Opponents
 of the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier are denied the right to
 organize, union activity and political expression are closely
 monitored; prison, torture, and exile are used to suppress dissent
 (Organization of American States [OAS], 1983; Amnesty, 1983).
 Thus many who have left Haiti in the last quarter century-or in
 the last five years-well may be "economic migrants," as the State
 Department has consistently claimed. Yet others, whose flight
 was motivated by personal fear, clearly meet the present Ameri-
 can, and long-standing international, definitions of "refugee."
 The importance of distinguishing between "economic mi-
 grants" and political "refugees" has become clearer since 1980,
 though such a distinction has in fact been relevant to Haitian
 migrants since the early 1970s. In 1980, growing resistance to
 Indochinese refugee flow, concerns about illegal Mexican migra-
 tion, and the boat lift of some 125,000 Cubans from Mariel
 harbor demonstrated that not every alien would be welcomed.
 Yet in that year, Congress enacted a new refugee law that, for the
 first time, unequivocally guaranteed asylum to any migrant from
 any country arriving in United States and able to demonstrate a
 personal, "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
 religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
 political opinion."
 The present asylum rights of Haitians are more generous than
 they have ever been in the past. Yet Haitians have in fact been
 claiming asylm or its equivalent in significant numbers since the
 early 1970s, and have been especially discriminated against.
 Long-standing prejudice and restrictionist fears cannot be ignor-
 ed as contributing factors. Yet it is the contention of this article
 that the principal reason for the special immigration animus
 against Haitians, particularly as it has displayed itself in the
 handling of political asylum claims, has been the close political
 relationship between the United States and the Duvaliers pere
 and fils. We argue that shared anticommunist objectives have
 taken priority over human rights concerns since the late 1950s,
 and that individual asylum applicants, and the integrity of the
 asylum determination process, have been the primary victims of
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 that policy. Thus, we intend to show that the denial of virtually
 every Haitian claim between 1972 and 1980 reflected conscious
 policy choices. More importantly, we will argue that similar
 choices continue to affect the processing of Haitian asylum claims
 today, despite the provisions of the new refugee act.
 Haiti under Francois Duvalier
 Haitian migration is not a new phenomenon. Since the late
 nineteenth century, Haitians have been working as migrant labor
 in agriculture throughout the Caribbean. During the U. S.
 occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934, hundreds of
 thousands of unskilled Haitian laborers were encouraged to
 migrate to both Cuba and the Dominican Republic to work in
 sugar mills and plantations (Lundahl, 1979: 623-627; Boswell,
 1982: 18). These flows were temporarily halted in the 1930s due to
 worldwide economic depression and a massacre of Haitians
 ordered by the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo.
 Another wave of mass emigration from Haiti was initiated in
 the mid 1950s. Economic stagnation and political turmoil,
 followed by the consolidation of power by Duvalier, caused
 thousands of Haitians to flee to the United States, Canada,
 France, Africa, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and elsewhere in the
 Caribbean Basin. From the ouster of the former President Paul E.
 Magloire in December 1956, to Duvalier's accession to power, six
 provisional regimes had attempted to gain power in Haiti.
 Finally, in July 1957, a military junta headed by General Kebreau
 took control and set elections for September of that year. Dr.
 Duvalier was the favored candidate of the junta and every effort
 (including disqualifying candidates and strict censoring of the
 media prior to the election) was made to ensure his victory.
 Duvalier assumed power in September 1957 in one of the
 poorest countries of the world. The country was in dire economic
 straits despite attempts by both the IMF and United States to
 stabilize the country through special assistance programs (New
 York Times, 1957a; 1957b). Conditions worsened during his
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 administration and have not improved significantly during the
 administration of his son. Haiti has the highest infant mortality
 rate, the lowest nutrition standards, and the highest illiteracy rate
 in the Western Hemisphere (Inter-American Development Bank,
 1958-1980; World Bank, 1981; Lundahl, 1979). A recent World
 Bank survey determined that three out of four Haitians live at or
 below the absolute poverty level and that per capita income in
 many rural areas is less than $100 (1981).
 The causes of poverty in Haiti are deep rooted. Most Haitians
 live in the countryside and rely on the agricultural sector for their
 livelihood. Unfortunately, two-thirds of Haiti consists of steep,
 largely eroded mountains that are unsuitable for cultivation.
 Demographic concentration in the countryside and a very uneven
 land tenure situation have, over time, reduced Haitian agriculture
 to a vicious circle of poverty. In addition, Haiti has virtually no
 natural resources and possesses only the most rudimentary
 infrastructure.
 Haitian poverty, however, results not from demographic
 pressures, soil erosion, and natural scarcity alone. It also derives
 from deliberately maintained patterns of economic inequality
 and abuses of political power (Lundahl, 1979: 623-647; Roberts,
 1978; Lichtenberg, 1982). According to one scholarly study of the
 Haitian economy:
 In spite of the compelling fact that agriculture has always
 constituted the very backbone of the Haitian economy, the
 Haitian governments have traditionally done next to nothing to
 improve the lot of the peasants. The gulf between the peasant and
 his government is abysmally wide.... Economic development has
 never been a political goal in Haiti. Instead, a never-ending stream
 of kleptocracies who could think of little else than filling their
 pockets have squandered the available funds in their attempts to
 gain or retain the presidency [Lundahl, 1979: 636; U. S. AID,
 1977: 143].'
 The presidencies of Francois and Jean Claude Duvalier have
 proven to be no exception to this historical pattern of rule. The
 Haitian government continues to control tightly every aspect of
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 the collection of revenues and expenditures, and there have been
 continual reports of government curruption and mismanagement
 of funds. Thus, a 1979 World Bank report revealed that in 1977
 almost 40% of all expenditures and revenues were channeled
 through special checking accounts held at the National Bank,
 making it virtually impossible to determine their source or
 eventual disposition (World Bank, 1981). In 1978, the Congres-
 sional Research Service estimated that 50% of Haiti's income was
 in unbudgeted accounts that were presumed to end up in private
 hands (Roberts, 1978). In its 1979 report on human rights in
 Haiti, the U. S. State Department concluded: "Corruption is
 traditional at all levels of society, and significant amounts of
 domestic revenues usable for development continue to be divert-
 ed to personal enrichment (U. S. State Department, 1980: 344)."
 Even the money that Haiti does devote to legitimate government
 expenditures has little effect on easing economic and social
 inequalities. The Haitian government devotes less domestic
 revenue per capita than any other country in the hemisphere to
 such social necessities as public education, public health, or
 agricultural extension services (Lundahl, 1979: 641).
 Once in power, Francois Duvalier ruthlessly purged the
 country of all real and suspected opposition. He systematically
 reduced the political role of the army, dismissed successive
 commanders-in-chief and a large number of professional officers
 of all ranks, and closed the military academy (Heinl and Heinl,
 1978). Duvalier, in turn, created a paramilitary force, called the
 tonton macoutes, later combined into the Service Volontaire
 Militaire, who were directly responsible to the president and
 would obey his orders without question or scruple. The majority
 of tonton macoutes have been unpaid and therefore have had to
 earn their livelihood by extorting money and property with
 threats of violence against their fellow Haitians.
 The political opposition to Duvalier was dealt with through
 these personal instruments of state terror. In probably the first
 widespread use of "disappearances" in the Western Hemisphere,
 Duvalier's paramilitary forces wielded wide discretionary power
 to arrest, imprison, torture, and put to death any Haitian citizen
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 without even an order in writing. Opponents of the regime or
 those merely under suspicion disappeared without trace (Interna-
 tional Commission of Jurists, 1963: 19-25; 1966: 1-5; 1967: 28-33;
 Heinl, and Heinl, 1978; Rotberg, 1971; Deiderich and Burt, 1969;
 Manigat, 1964). The disappeared came from all ranks, including
 labor union representatives, professors and students, lawyers
 who defended critics of the regime, peasants suspected of
 harboring "subversives," and people abducted out of personal
 caprice of the tonton macoutes. Duvalier's agents directed their
 terror not only against their perceived enemies, but against the
 relatives of their enemies as well. Sometimes whole families were
 exterminated in political reprisals. The victims were completely
 without access to lawyers and Duvalier rejected proposals by the
 Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Interna-
 tional Commission of Jurists to make on-site visits.
 All other potential opposition was likewise crushed. The
 National Union of Haitian Workers, which was the largest
 association of labor unions, was disbanded. The government used
 coercion to enforce press censorship. The Catholic churh was
 silenced as a political force through expulsion of its leadership.
 The legislative and judicial branches delegated all their effective
 authority to the president who ruled the country for most of his
 tenure under a state of emergency. The government deliberately
 ignored individual freedoms, and hundreds of political prisoners
 were taken and held at Fort Dimanche, the notorious "death
 prison." Numerous organizations protested human rights viola-
 tions there (New York Times, 1958h; 1958g; 1958f; 1958e; 1958d;
 1958a; 1959a) and the International Commission of Jurists
 termed Haiti a country in which every single article and paragraph
 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was being
 systematically violated (International Commission of Jurists,
 1967: 28).
 The Flight of Refugees
 Under such circumstances, the flow of persons fleeing Haiti to
 ensure their personal safety increased dramatically, and the
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 United States was the preferred choice for most Haitian em-
 igrants. The first wave consisted principally of former government
 officials and politicans, professionals, businessmen, and other
 urban or middle-class persons, many of whom were either fleeing
 the tyranny of Duvalier or had no economic mobility in the new
 political order. Those wishing to leave Haiti were required to
 purchase a passport and exit visa, compulsory travel insurance,
 and to pay exit and other taxes. Most lower-class Haitians who
 could not afford the cost of exit documents and airfare to the U.S.
 left Haiti illegally and sailed to the Bahamas where immigration
 laws were not strictly enforced against them.
 The Haitian government made little effort to curb this outflow,
 as the export of large numbers of potential dissidents and
 disaffected persons contributed to the maintenance of the Du-
 valier regime. Moreover, the property of dissidents was seized by
 Duvalier's security forces, and emigrant remittances became an
 important source of revenue, particularly as Haiti became
 increasingly isolated from the international community in the
 1960s (Segal, 1975: 197-204).
 Almost all Haitians who entered the U.S. arrived by air with
 some type of visa. The majority of those with nonimmigrant visas
 simply overstayed and remained illegally. Perhaps because these
 Haitians were generally well-educated and reasonably well-to-do,
 the U.S. Immigration Service (INS) took a laissez-faire attitude
 toward them, did not actively pursue those who remained
 illegally, and rarely deported them. If Haitians claimed political
 refugee status, the INS ordinarily placed them under "docket
 control," in effect failing to enforce orders of deportation while
 granting work authorization, yet denying all opportunity to
 obtain "permanent residence" status (Dominguez, 1975: 31). This
 treatment was similar to that initially afforded hundreds of
 Cubans who arrived in the United States- without visas during the
 first years of the Castro regime. However, subsequent steps to
 relax immigration rules for Cubans, including the practice of
 waiving the visa requirement altogether, and the passage of
 Public Law 762, in 1966 to grant earlier arrivals "permanent
 resident" status were not taken for the Haitians.
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 Most Haitians settled in New York City where industrial and
 service employment was readily available, with lesser numbers
 going to Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and Miami. In
 contrast with the Cubans, for whom a special federal program
 was created during the last months of the Eisenhower administra-
 tion (Moore, 1980),2 the Haitians received no U.S. federal or state
 assistance, and little aid was given by private organizations.
 The major exile leaders sought unsuccessfully to organize
 politically and to raise funds for arms in order to overthrow
 Duvalier by invasion and intrigue from without. Despite the
 formation of umbrella organizations among rival exile groups,
 the opposition forces outside Haiti remained small and divided.
 Exile leaders were scattered throughout the Western Hemisphere
 in New York, Miami, Montreal, San Juan, Santo Domingo, and
 Havana-and were basically antagonistic to one other.
 U.S. Foreign Policy Interests
 Although the Eisenhower administration was willing to allow
 Haitians to remain in the U.S. outside of regular immigration
 procedures, it was clearly unwilling to maintain anything but a
 distant relationship with the exile leaders. Unlike the Cuban
 exiles whom the U.S. government utilized in fomenting aggression
 against Castro, the U.S. was not interested in surreptitiously
 sponsoring an armed incursion by exiled Haitians. Francois
 Duvalier quickly gained U.S. support after his accession to power
 in 1957 and the Eisenhower administration remained closely
 aligned to him in succeeding years. Responding to an unsuccessful
 Florida-based exile attempt to overthrow Duvalier on July 29,
 1958, Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter advised Pres-
 ident Eisenhower:
 I recommend that you agree to receive the Foreign Minister of
 Haiti, Dr. Louis Mars, ... so that he may deliver a message to you
 from Haitian President Francois Duvalier. The message request
 United States military assistance to help Haiti defend itself from
 armed attacks it fears will be made on it in the near future....
 Since the principal opponents of the Haitian Government are now
 in exile in the United States and because a recent revolutionary
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 attempt was apparently launched from United States soil, I believe
 that it is highly desirable that you receive the Foreign Minister in
 order to dispel any impression that we countenance the organiza-
 tion of revolutionary expeditions in the United States against Dr.
 Duvalier's government [Herter, 1958].
 Throughout the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. ignored
 Duvalier's elimination of his rivals and the violation of human
 rights in Haiti. The New York Times (1958c; 1958b), acknowl-
 edging that his methods were brutal, gave Duvalier its support,
 calling him "a man of principle with a desire to pacify his
 country."
 Strategically situated between the Atlantic Ocean and Carib-
 bean Sea, Haiti has long been regarded as within the sphere of
 American influence. Prior to World War II, influence was exerted
 through direct military intervention (Schmidt, 1971). After the
 war, it was exerted through economic and, as time progressed,
 direct military aid. Economic aid began in 1946, and the U.S.
 provided about $120 million in economic assistance between 1946
 and 1972 (Weil, 1973: 124, 145-146). Under the 1951 Military
 Security Act, the U.S. extended Haiti $4.5 million in military aid
 from 1950 to 1963, after which the program was discontinued
 until 1970 (Weil, 1973). Bilateral military assistance agreements
 were first entered into in 1955. In return, Haiti supported
 American positions in the United Nations and the OAS.
 With the triumph of Fidel Castro in Cuba in January 1959,
 Cuba became the site of the first Marxist-Leninist revolution in
 the Americas and a source of chronic concern in the U.S. The
 U.S. was particularly concerned that Cuba, in its general desire to
 export revolution in the region, might use Haitian exiles to
 organize and support a movement to overthrow the Duvalier
 regime (U.S. Department of State, 1960: 340-341). Indeed the
 most active exile activity at the time originated in Cuba, where
 Castro made available to Haitian exiles a radio station and
 logistical support for invasions of Haiti, which proved abortive.
 Charging that the commuist menace emanating from Cuba
 threatened the security of his country, Duvalier took a firm
 anticommunist posture in foreign affairs and stressed his loyalty
 to the U.S. Duvalier also made repeated offers of military
 cooperation, including a naval base in Haiti, sites suitable for
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 amphibious training of U.S. forces, sites for U.S. missle installa-
 tions and for U.S. missle tracking stations (Duvalier, 1959).3 By
 early 1959, the U.S. officially announced its decision to shore up
 the Haitian government with a major new economic aid program.
 It was the view of the State Department then that Duvalier "had
 given more stability to Haiti than any exile coalition would" and
 his overthrow might plunge Haiti into chaos (New York Times,
 1959b).
 Duvalier used the American military presence, in particular, as
 a way to buttress his own regime and to immobilize effectively the
 activities of anti-Duvalier opposition outside Haiti. The frequent
 port calls of the U.S. fleet at Port-au-Prince, and the arrival in
 early 1959 of a U.S. Marine Mission to train the Haitian army,
 were visible demonstrations of American support. In addition,
 the U.S. began supplying equipment for the modernization of
 Haiti's military establishment and underwrote a major portion of
 the budget deficit, including $11 million in 1960 and $13.5 million
 in 1961, slightly less than half of Haiti's public expenditures for
 the year (Rotberg, 1971: 236). According to a State Department
 official in 1961, the U.S. had "no other alternative (than Duvalier)
 and ought to try to elevate the standard of living for the people
 and raise their level of civilization" (Hispanic American Report,
 1961: 607).
 The Kennedy Administration and
 the Isolation of Duvalier
 The inauguration of President John F. Kennedy brought about
 a shift of emphasis in U.S. policy toward Latin America.
 American policy, in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, sought to
 improve the economic and social welfare of the people in the
 Western Hemisphere and to defend democratic institutions
 against the Cuban threat (Martin, 1963: 711). Human rights
 conditions inside Haiti grew so horrendous and Duvalier's
 attitude toward other states became so antagonistic that Kennedy
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 no longer wanted to be identified with him. The watershed event
 in U.S.-Haitian relations was the fraudulent reelection in May
 1961, of Francois Duvalier as President, by the margin of
 1,320,780 to 0, before his term of office had expired and in open
 breach of the 1957 constitution, for a further six-year term
 beginning on May 15, 1963. Thereafter, U.S.-Haitian relations
 deteriorated rapidly. U.S. Ambassador Robert Newbegin was
 recalled to Washington and purposely absented himself when
 Duvalier was inagurated as president for his second term of office
 (Heinl, and Heinl, 1978).4 When Newbegin returned to Haiti,
 U.S. relations were conducted on a "cool but correct" basis.
 Although the U.S. publicly maintained that there continued to
 be no viable alternative to Duvalier, the Kennedy administration
 tried to develop that alternative by channelling financial assis-
 tance to Haitian opposition figures such as Magloire. Such aid
 was meant to convey the message to Duvalier that there were
 limits to American tolerance of his regime. While Kennedy
 wished to remove Duvalier or bring about radical improvements
 in his methods of rule, he feared creating a "second Cuba" in the
 Western hemisphere. Hoping to ensure a stable, friendly govern-
 ment as a successor to Duvalier, the Kennedy administration, in
 the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "used persuasion, aid,
 pressure and almost all techniques short of the landing of outside
 forces" to bring about changes in Haiti (Heinl, and Heinl, 1978:
 622).
 Haitian exiles willing to undertake military action were not in
 the vanguard of American policy toward Haiti, but they did play
 a role. After the abortive CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion in
 April 1961, the U.S. was reluctant to support any large-scale
 military enterprises in the hemisphere; yet the CIA extended its
 efforts beyond Cuba to support covert activities in other nations
 of the Latin American periphery. Not surprisingly, the CIA and
 the Special Operations Branch of the State Department continued
 to have an interest in Haitian affairs into the 1980s. Included were
 several attempts to arm and support exile invasions of Haiti to
 overthrow Duvalier. Haitian groups received secret U.S. govern-
 ment funds and there were ties between U.S. intelligence agencies
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 and the exile groups that invaded Haiti in 1963 (New York Times,
 1975a; 1975b).5
 The U.S. also threatened to cut off economic aid, but Duvalier
 successfully used his leverage at the Organization of American
 States to delay and frustrate the employment of economic
 sanctions. At the OAS's Eighth Meeting of Consultation of
 Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este, in January 1962, Haiti found
 itself in the position of casting the decisive vote on the expulsion
 of Cuba from the OAS, and it used this vote to gain additional
 U.S. economic aid to build a jet airport and a hospital (Schle-
 singer, 1965: 782-783). Some $ 10 million in additional Agency for
 International Development (AID) funds were also pledged. Most
 American aid was suspended again in July 1962, because of
 growing concern over Haitian governmental corruption, rapidly
 accumulating human rights violations, and the total official
 indifference to the plight of Haitian citizenry. Again political
 maneuvering, rather than improvement in conditions, blunted
 the force of U.S. disapproval. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of
 October 1962, Duvalier placed Haiti's harbors and air fields at the
 disposal of U.S. forces carrying out the military quarantine of
 Cuba. Subsequently some aid was restored, in particular U.S.
 support in the construction of the jet airport, one of Duvalier's pet
 projects.
 Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration's relationship with
 Haiti grew progressively worse. The deterioration in relations
 climaxed in 1963, when Haiti's forcible entry and occupation of
 the Dominican Embassy in Port-au-Prince precipitated a major
 regional crisis. Maximum pressure, short of military intervention,
 was employed to prevent Duvalier from continuing. At the height
 of the crisis, Under-Secretary of State George Ball described the
 Duvalier regime as "falling apart and in a kind of progressive
 disintegration" (New York Times, 1963). When Duvalier resisted
 American pressure to step down at the end of this original six-
 year term in May 1963, the Kennedy administration cut off
 economic aid, suspended diplomatic relations for a month in
 protest, and evacuated all American citizens from Haiti. Military
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 assistance was suspended as well, and the mission chief and
 military missions were expelled from Haiti. In August 1963, a
 force of Haitian exiles under General Leon Cantave invaded
 Haiti, but the invasion failed and was defeated. Despite con-
 siderable anti-Duvalier propaganda, a show of military force,
 manipulation of grants-in-aid, and diplomatic pressure, the
 Haitian regime maintained itself in power.
 The Johnson Administration and the
 Near Normalization of U. S.-Haitian Relations
 U.S. ostracism of Haiti was short lived. With the accession to
 power of President Lyndon Johnson, the policy of economic and
 diplomatic sanctions against Haiti was moderated and the U.S.
 developed a less critical stance toward Duvalier. A new U.S.
 ambassador was appointed, and the U.S. representative to the
 Inter-American Development Bank, reversing an earlier veto,
 approved a $2.4 million loan to Haiti. Despite a blistering critique
 of human rights conditions in Haiti by the International Com-
 mission of Jurists and Haitian plans to revise their constitution to
 proclaim Duvalier "president for life," Ambassador Benson
 Timmons attended celebrations marking the second anniversary
 of Duvalier's self-appointed presidency, thus officially linking the
 U.S. with the ruling regime.
 The rationale for this shift in policy was clear. The U. S.
 continued to find Haiti's support at the OAS extremely useful. In
 July 1964, Haiti voted along with the U. S. to impose OAS
 sanctions against Cuba. With the advent of the Dominican crisis
 in April 1965, Haiti's vote in the OAS was again crucial for U. S.
 interests. Despite considerable opposition among Latin Ameri-
 can states to creating an Inter-American Peace Force to legitimize
 American intervention in the Dominican Republic, Haiti contri-
 buted to the bare two-thirds majority vote needed to pass the
 OAS resolution. There was also a sense among policymakers
 that, although Haiti was perhaps the most repressive nation in
 Latin America, it was also the poorest. Therefore, efforts to
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Fri, 29 Apr 2016 15:21:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 326 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
 promote respect for human rights were perceived to be fruitless
 and counter-productive, at least until development had progress-
 ed significantly.
 By 1966 the U. S. was once again giving Haiti considerable
 indirect support and encouraging the resumption of private
 investment and tourism. Haiti successfully solicited further loans
 from the Inter-American Development Bank (with U. S. acqui-
 escence) and received aid from the Food and Agriculture
 Organization (FAO) and voluntary agencies that distributed AID
 funds quietly. The U.S. Navy resumed making port calls in Haiti,
 and there were reports of aircraft and other arms being smuggled
 from the U.S. to Haiti without benefit of U.S. export licenses
 (Hispanic American Report, 1964a: 804-805).
 Of perhaps greater importance to Duvalier, the U. S. adopted
 measures to prevent U. S. territory from being used as a base by
 Haitian exiles. Radio jamming equipment was provided to Haiti
 to counter the broadcasts of anti-Duvalier exiles, and a vigorous
 law enforcement effort was initiated to stop exile activities-
 organization, training, fundraising, or launching attacks-based
 in the U. S. and aimed at Haiti. On several occasions in 1967,
 1968, and 1969, American officials arrested groups of Haitian
 exiles training in Florida, seized large arms caches, and indicted
 their leaders for planning to invade Haiti and to export arms
 illegally (New York Times, 1967; 1968a; 1968b; 1969a; 1969b;
 1970). In contrast, although CIA on-the-record financing of
 Cuban exile activities was terminated in May 1963, cir-
 cumstantial evidence suggests that radical anti-Castro Cubans
 continued to receive secret U. S. government aid for at least
 another decade or more (Scanlan and Loescher, 1983: 116-137).
 The New Haitian Exodus
 These actions served to consolidate Duvalier's hold on Haiti,
 which by the mid-1960s had become one of the most repressive
 countries in the world (International Commission of Jurists,
 1963). More and more Haitians joined the large number of exiles
 abroad. However, unlike the earlier groups, this new flow
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 included urban skilled and semiskilled workers and even a few
 peasants who had borrowed, or whose relatives provided, the cost
 of a visa and a ticket. Composed in part of migrants with less hope
 of returning to Haiti, and containing more individuals whose
 grievances were based on the general misery of life in Haiti, rather
 than on a coherent program of opposition to the Duvalier regime
 or on personal histories of persecution, not all of the new arrivals
 would have qualified as "refugees" under prevailing standards of
 international law. Nevertheless, their motives for departure were
 at least as political as their Cuban counterparts, who entered the
 country by the thousands in the U. S. sponsored "freedom flights"
 that began in 1965 and continued into 1973. No similar departure
 program was ever establised for the Haitians. Those who could
 not afford the cost of exit documents and air fare to New York or
 who had to flee quickly continued to cross the border illegally to
 the Dominican Republic (Hispanic American Report 1964b:
 1061)6 or to sail to the Bahamas where they would stay without
 legal admittance or work permits. Although many found work in
 the Bahamas, Haitian emigrants lived in constant fear of being
 discovered by the police and being thrown into prison before
 being deported back to Haiti (Boswell, 1982: 18-19).
 In the early 1970s, a major new stream of Haitians-the boat
 people-began arriving in the United States. The first known
 boat load of Haitians landed on Florida's coast in 1963. They
 requested political asylum, were denied it by the INS, and were
 returned to Haiti. Beginning in late 1972, a virtually continuous
 flow of boats with Haitians seeking political asylum began to land
 in South Florida. In contrast to previous flows to the U. S. greater
 numbers of those arriving were poor, uneducated, and of rural
 origin (Boswell, 1983: 61-62). There were several reasons for this
 shift in the character of flow. Among them were a crackdown on
 the Haitians in the Bahamas; more restrictive policies governing
 the grant of nonimmigrant visas, coupled with vigorous INS
 enforcement of immigration laws; and an interest by Haitian local
 authorities in financial gains in continued illegal emigration.
 Haiti was also feeling the effect of a decade of international
 isolation and political turmoil and violence. The flight out of
 Haiti by professionals and technicians during the 1960s had had a
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 catastrophic effect on the economy. In addition, the countryside
 suffered from years of governmental neglect and corruption. One
 major result was the start-up of an out-migration of large
 numbers of the rural sector of the Haitian population, particu-
 larly those from northern Haiti, the poorest region of the country.
 Moreover, under Jean-Claude Duvalier, the security forces
 expanded their activities in rural areas and expropriated large
 areas of scarce fertile land. This pattern of corruption affected the
 country's rural population particularly harshly (Maguire, 1981:
 9). 7Also in the mid 1970s, the INS began to curtail its granting of
 legal entry to Haitians in Port-au-Prince who wanted to visit the
 U. S. temporarily. Haitians were required to demonstrate ties that
 would ensure a return to Haiti such as bank accounts, ownership
 of land, a job, and a round-trip air ticket. The effect of this
 enforcement was to reduce immigration by air to the U.S. and to
 increase illegal immigration by boat to Florida. In addition, a
 large-scale smuggling industry developed with official con-
 nivance. By the late 1970s, Haitians were transported in large
 numbers aboard freighters to Florida while others continued to
 come via small boats.
 For these reasons, larger numbers of Haitians began arriving
 on the Florida coast in late 1972. An estimated 3,500 Haitians
 arrived between 1972 and 1977 (Lawyers Committee, 1978: 3).
 Many of them were able to find work and remain undetected. In
 the meantime, to the consternation of U. S. officials, a migration
 network was quickly being established. As more Haitians relo-
 cated in Florida and communicated their success back home,
 larger numbers of Haitians were encouraged to depart for Miami.
 U. S.-Haitian Relations Under
 The Nixon Administration
 Along with this flow of new Haitians to the U. S. there occurred
 an important shift in American foreign policy toward Duvalier
 under the Nixon administration. Governor Nelson Rockefeller,
 as special envoy for President Nixon, visited Port-au-Prince in
 July 1969. while in Haiti, Rockefeller delivered a personal letter
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 from Nixon to Duvalier, and members of his party publicly
 expressed hope for the resumption of direct U. S. aid to Haiti
 (New York Times, 1969c). Shortly thereafter U. S. Ambassador
 Clinton Knox recommended the renewal of aid. Spurred on by U.
 S. interest, the Inter-American Development Bank loaned over
 $5 million to improve the water system of Port-au-Prince and the
 International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a new stand-by
 credit. In 1970, the Nixon administration lifted the ban imposed
 by President Kennedy on the sale of arms to Haiti, and the
 Department of State authorized over $1 million in private arms
 sales in 1971.
 These activities picked up after the accession to power of
 Jean-Claude Duvalier in April 1971. In a visible demonstration of
 American support for the regime, the U. S. fleet was sent to ply
 Haitian waters to prevent any attempted landing by Haitian
 exiles. A private arms company based in Miami was engaged to
 train the Leopards, an elite counter-insurgency force that served
 as a personal bodyguard to the new president. In March of 1972, a
 Haitian delegation visited the Departments of State and Defense
 in Washington, D. C., and in July a U. S. survey team travelled to
 Haiti to assess that country's request for military assistance. An
 economic assistance program was established by year's end, after
 nearly a ten-year absence.
 These actions were consistent with the broad views of Nixon
 and Kissinger, who believed that the importance of protecting the
 transit of shipping through the Windward Passage, the fear of a
 Castro-type government coming to power in Haiti, an on-going
 campaign to keep allies in the OAS who would maintain
 opposition to normalized relations with Cuba, and the U. S.
 interest in safeguarding its commercial and Political interests in
 the neighboring Dominican Republic all overrode American
 concerns about human rights violations in Haiti.
 Human Rights Under
 Jean-Claude Duvalier
 Accompanying this shift in official relations was a concerted
 effort on the part of the U. S. and Haiti to portray the
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 administration of "Baby Doc" as being significantly less repres-
 sive and more benign than had been the rule of "Papa Doc." It
 was the opinion of several major human rights organizations,
 however, that while the most flagrant forms of repression were
 toned down under the new regime, widespread human rights
 violations continued. A report in 1973 by Amnesty International
 noted:
 Haiti's prisons are still filled with people who have spent many
 years in detention without ever being charged or brought to trial.
 Amnesty International remains seriously concerned with the
 continued repression of dissent in Haiti and the denial of human
 and legal rights .... The variety of torture to which the detainee is
 subjected is incredible: clubbing to death, maiming of the genitals,
 food deprivation to the point of starvation, and the insertion of
 red-hot pokers into the back passage.... In fact, these prisons are
 death traps. . . [and] find a parallel with the Nazi concentration
 camps of the past but have no present-day equivalent.
 Senator Edward Brooke, in a report to the Senate Appro-
 priations Committee in 1974, concluded that although "the grim
 visible terror of Francois Duvalier's regime may have subsided, it
 seems that autocratic rule characterized by an unflinching
 willingness to suppress people has not" (U.S. Congress, Senate
 Appropriations, 1974). The (OAS) condemned the "very serious
 violation of the right to liberty and personal security" by the
 Haitian government (OAS, 1973). The AFL-CIO News reported
 the testimony of its legislative representative, Howard McGaigan,
 before the Senate Appropriations Committee: "The AFL-CIO
 witness stressed that the dictatorship in Haiti has not become
 significantly less oppressive with Jean-Claude Duvalier. Midnight
 arrests, secret police and absolute suppression of all freedoms still
 are the tools of Haiti's rulers" (AFL-CIO News, 1974). By 1975,
 Amnesty International saw little or no improvement in the
 Haitian government's treatment of its citizens: "Arrests are
 carried out without warrants and often take the form of
 disappearances of kidnapping. . . Prisoners are not allowed
 lawywers, nor contact with their families on arrest nor-with few
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 exceptions-are they charged or brought to trial" (Amnesty,
 1975-1976).
 Thus, during the Nixon and Ford administrations, Haitians
 continued to flee a regime that was not only impoverished, but
 remained extremely repressive. The numbers of those entering the
 U. S. remained fairly constant; yet from 1973 on, an increasing
 percentage came by boat and eventually sought political asylum.
 The Denial of Asylum
 The U.S. response to these boat people-with one notable
 exception-was predictable and negative. That exception oc-
 curred in 1970, when a boat load of Haitian Coastguardsmen who
 had shelled the Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince were
 granted asylum. By 1973, however, a policy of denying refugee
 status to all Haitian applicants was firmly in place. The denial of
 asylum to arriving Haitians was buttressed by a series of
 reinforcing practices detention, and the requirement of bond,
 and the denial of work authorization and due process (Zucker,
 1983: 151-162). The standard operating practice at that time was
 to detain apprehended Haitians in state and local penal insti-
 tutions pending voluntary return to Haiti. They could be released
 provided a $500 bond was posted, but they were denied work
 authorizations. The Miami District Director of the INS ex-
 plained, "We feel that any relaxation of the rules could produce a
 flood of economic refugees from all over the Carribean" (New
 York Times, 1976).
 Thus, it was the INS position that the Haitians, mostly rural in
 origin, illiterate, and only semiskilled, were simply illegal mi-
 grants from an underdeveloped country and not definitionally
 refugees. The INS position was summarized by the following
 statement of then INS Commissioner Leonard Chapman: "Un-
 like other large alien nationality groups which have fled sudden
 and intolerable political changes in their respective countries-
 for example, Hungary, Cuba, and Vietnam-almost all of the
 Haitian claimants seek to enter the United States or to remain
 here for the purpose of obtaining employment" (U. S. Congress,
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 1976: 1). Absent from Commissioner Chapman's statement were
 two necessary qualifications. First, many of the Cubans and other
 immigrants who had been admitted to the United States as
 refugees had not in fact fled "sudden and intolerable political
 changes." For example, the 270,000 Cubans who arrived in
 Florida between 1965 and 1973 on daily "Freedom Flights" were
 not fleeing a sudden political emergency, but in fact were
 admitted under a program designed to promote family reunifi-
 cation. The sharp distinction between immigrants and refugees
 that the Commissioner used to justify Haitian exclusion thus was
 not nearly as precise as he claimed. Second, however plausible the
 argument that most Haitians entering the United States were
 apolitical and motivated exclusively by economic concerns, that
 argument was essentially circular since ultimately reference to it
 depended for proof, not on a close examination of particular
 cases, but on statistics generated by an administrative process
 that had been designed to ignore allegations of human rights
 abuse and to prove that no Haitians taking advantage of it were
 worthy of asylym.
 The full dimensions of the abuse of the asylum system as it has
 been applied to Haitians did become apparent until the question
 was extensively litigated in the late 1970s. Yet civil rights groups
 and churches challenged the treatment afforded Haitians during
 the Nixon and Ford administrations, and Congressional hearings
 held in response during 1975 and 1976 (U. S. House Subcomm.
 On International Organizations, 1976) revealed a consistent
 pattern of conduct on the part of both the INS and the
 Department of State designed to defeat most Haitian claims.
 Unlike the occasional Cubans who continued to arrive by boat
 during this period and were seldom, if ever, threatened with
 return, arriving Haitians were immediately processed for exclu-
 sion or deportation. In order to avoid being returned to Haiti,
 they were required to demonstrate that they were in fact refugees
 as that term is defined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the
 Status for Refugees, that is, persons with "a well-founded fear of
 persecution" by reason of race, religion, political affiliation, or
 membership in a persecuted group (Convention, 1951). Such a
 showing was required under the 1975 Code of Federal Regula-
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 tions, although prior to 1980, even those who proved probable
 persecution were not always entitled to asylum. Under both U. S.
 and international legal standards, the burden of demonstrating
 refugee status lay then (as it does now) on the refugee. Interna-
 tional authorities recognized, however, that an asylum applicant
 arriving frightened and without documents often has a difficult
 case to make. They therefore recommended administrative
 procedures designed to evaluate carefully an applicant's story for
 credibility and to give the applicant "the benefit of the doubt"
 when his or her story seemed credible. U. S. procedures were
 tailored to produce neither careful evaluations nor any favorable
 reaction to troublesome claims. Instead the hearings showed that
 incoming Haitians were given only, on average, a twenty-minute
 interview by the INS, of which five-minutes were spent on
 political issues, to prove their case through an interpreter.
 Because of the language barrier and the cursory nature of the
 initial INS interviews, many Haitian advocates contended that
 Haitians were not given any real opportunity to present their
 legitimate claims for political asylum. Adding to the difficulties
 posed by assembly-line processing and a severe language barrier
 was the fact that the INS agents processing Haitians' claims had
 received no training of any kind either in asylum law or with
 respect to human rights conditions in Haiti. Rather than attempt-
 ing to overcome these procedural deficiences, the INS intensified
 them by effectively denying almost all Haitian applicants a legal
 counsel, and sometimes by moving them hundreds of miles from
 their place of apprehension before granting them unpublicized
 and speedily arranged asylum interviews.
 These hearings also revealed the primary role of the Depart-
 ment of State in the asylum decision process. Although it has
 always been entrusted with the duty of evaluating individual
 asylum claims, prior to 1980 the INS was required to seek an
 "advisory opinion" from the State Department on doubtful cases
 and on those that the INS considered to be without substance
 (U.S. Congress, House, 1976: 3). Because the State Department
 has access to considerable information about human rights con-
 ditions abroad, they have at least a general knowledge of patterns
 of persecution in particular countries. Yet, as these hearings
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 revealed, the INS often sent only a summary of the initial
 interview to the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs (ORM)
 at the State Department where- political asylum claims were
 supposed to be reviewed individually by asylum officers. An
 ORM study of a claim was based on the applicant's file, and the
 applicants themselves were never personally examined by the
 ORM.- The asylum officers had no standardized guidelines for
 applying the definition of refugee to particular claims. In general,
 the applicant for asylum was required to demonstrate that,
 because of activities or organizational affiliations and due to
 political conditions inside Haiti, persecution would likely result if
 he or she were returned home. Before issuing an advisory opinion
 to the INS, the applicant's claim was passed through ORM to the
 Haitian desk officer for review. In pratically every case, the
 decision of the desk officer was then-and still remains-crucial.
 The determinations themselves were often based on the assump-
 tion that Haitian asylum claims were not valid. Testifying before
 the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Wil-
 liam Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
 American Affairs stated:
 The great majority of Haitians who are illegally in.the United
 States say, when first apprehended, that they have come to the
 United, States to seek employment. In very few instances are they
 able to demonstrate that they have been or will be persecuted by
 their government. Frequently they claim that they will be punished
 on return to Haiti simply because they left their country without
 permission; but the evidence available to us does not support such
 claims. In cases such as these, it is not possible under present laws
 and regulations to conclude that they are other than illegal
 immigrants, subject to exclusion or deportation proceedings like
 similar illegal immigrants from nations throughout the world
 [U.S. Congress House, 1975: 4].
 In very few instances were cases ever referred to the U. S.
 Embassy in Port-au-Prince for further verification or investiga-
 tion, nor was much effort expended to monitor returnees. Indeed
 a report by a House Subcommittee confirmed that the Embassy
 had no guidelines for review of such asylum claims and did not
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 have enough personnel to carry through this kind of effort (U. S.
 Congress, House, 1976). Furthermore, in making broad recommenda-
 tions based on conditions in particular countries, the Department
 of State tended to emphasize its primary commitment to further-
 ing American foreign policy objectives and maintaining good
 relations with allies, thus minimizing humanitarian concerns. The
 decisions actually reached by the Department of State almost
 always reflected Cold War priorities and reluctance to pass
 judgement on the internal conditions of any allied country. This
 attitude had already displayed itself in the State Department
 decision not to admit any of the thousands of Chileans who fled
 the widespread repression in their country after the military coup
 of September 1973 (U. S. Congress, Senate, 1974; Hanson, 1978:
 107-141). In the case of Haitians, denial of asylum was generally
 recommended in blanket fashion and without any meaningful
 review of individual applications.
 The National Council of Churches challenged INSs procedures
 and policies and sued on behalf of the Haitians. The 1977 suit,
 Gannon v. United States, asked that the INS end its practice of
 denying hearings to Haitians under order of exclusion while
 granting hearings for those facing deportation. It also asked that
 the Haitians be released from detention without bond and be
 given work authorization. In July 1976, while legal actions were
 still underway, the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizen-
 ship, and International Law supported the position of the
 National Council of Churches, and recommended that the INS
 develop uniform procedures for exclusion and deportation
 proceedings, and that it work closely with voluntary agencies to
 supervise the release of detained Haitians. It also recommended
 that State Department advisory opinions be more detailed and
 respond to specific allegations of individual claimants rather than
 make broad recommendations based on general conditions in
 Haiti. In particular, the Committee report encouraged that every
 effort be made to check on questionable cases and to monitor
 those persons who had been denied asylum and returned to Haiti
 (U.S. Congress, House, 1976: 13-15)
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 The Carter Administration
 and Human Rights
 When the Carter administration came to power, it attempted to
 incorporate human rights concerns into American foreign policy-
 making. The new administration did play an important role in
 furthering human rights in Latin America, (Schoultz, 1981) and
 took a number of human rights initiatives in regard to Haiti. As
 part of an overall reduction of military aid to the region, Haiti was
 dropped from the list of Foreign Military Sales recipients but
 kept its International Military Education and Training program.
 On a visit to Haiti in August 1977, Andrew Young, the U. S.
 Ambassador to the United Nations, expressed the Carter adminis-
 tration's desire to end support for regimes that violated human
 rights and favored the exploitation of the poor by the rich.
 Arguing that improvement in the human rights situation would
 have a direct effect on the aid and cooperation Haiti recieved
 from the U.S., Young said, "When people understand the way the
 winds are blowing and if they want to go with those winds, they
 trim their sails accordingly" (Washington Post, 1977: Al, A12).
 In an attempt to placate the Carter adminsitration, the Haitian
 government took a series of steps to improve its human rights
 image in the U. S. These included the hiring of the American law
 firm of Peabody, Rivlin, Lambert, and Meyers to influence U. S.
 policymakers in the Department of State, AID, the Overseas
 Private Investment Corporation, the House Committee on
 International Relations, and the Senate Committee on Foreign
 Relations; contracting the public relations firm of Edelman
 International to reform its image in the U. S. (Schoultz, 1981: 64);
 the partial relaxation of official repression during 1977 and 1978;
 the largest general amnesty of political prisoners in decades; and
 the invitation to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
 (IAHRC) to visit Haiti in July 1978.
 Although human rights conditions in Haiti improved some-
 what during 1977 and 1978, structural barriers to human rights
 protection continued to exist (U. S. Senate Comm. on Appropria-
 tions, 1977). According to the Department of State, brutality
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 "verging on torture" had been employed "'both as punishment for
 minor criminal infractions, to extract confessions, and to impose
 discipline in prison" (U.S. State Department 1978: 172-176). The
 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which visited
 Haiti in August 1978, and published its findings in 1980,
 concluded that there continued to be a breakdown in the rule of
 law; there was no effective or independent judiciary; few legal
 safeguards existed to protect people who fell out of favor with the
 government (IAHRC, 1980). Practically nothing was done to
 develop institutional structures through which these basic viola-
 tions could be ended.
 The Carter Administration and
 The Admission of Haitians
 Despite the Carter administration's specific emphasis on
 human rights, it did not develop an immigration policy toward
 Haiti that was free from contradiction. By the mid 1970s, the flow
 of Haitians to the U. S. was seen to be less "manageable" than
 earlier flows and there was a growing fear among American
 policymakers and the public that instability and oppression in the
 Third World would give rise to a sustained, and possibly
 increased, flow of poor and relatively unskilled people who were
 less assimilable into the domestic labor market. In addition, there
 were no strong foreign policy reasons to accept large numbers of
 Haitians as refugees. It was feared that offers of easy asylum
 would send mixed messages to Haiti and could be interpreted as
 an unfriendly act and support for a Haitian exile movement, and
 would only encourage an out-migration from Haiti. On Septem-
 ber 6, 1977, the State Department announced that it had returned
 to Haiti 97 refugees who had sailed into the U. S. naval base at
 Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a month earlier. According to a State
 Department representative: "To grant them political asylum...
 poses a problem of relations between the United States and the
 Haitian government, and to admit them as refugees from
 deteriorating economic conditions might encourage still more to
 flee" (New York Times, 1977).
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 In November 1977, after a long legal action that reached the
 Supreme Court and after numerous protests and a broad public
 campaign, INS Commissioner Leonel F. Castillo acceded to the
 demands of the National Council of Churches to release imprison-
 ed Haitians without bond, to authorize their employment, and to
 change INS regualtions so as to allow "excludable" Haitians a
 hearing on their asylum claim before an immigration judge. The
 INS, however, did not adopt unifrom procedures for exclusion
 and deportation proceedings until 1978, and since no Haitians
 who had been released in 1977 could be called in for hearings for
 more than a year, a backlog of 5000 cases developed. In the
 meantime, the INS regional office in Florida mistakenly broad-
 cast the message that all Haitians, rather than just those in the
 asylum process, were entitled to work authorizations. As a
 consequence, 3000 additional Haitians suddenly appeared and
 registered, thus identifying themselves for the first time to INS
 officials.
 IThis backlog was exacerbated by several additional develop-
 ments that directly affected the flow of Haitians to the U.S. In
 1978, the government of the Bahamas began'to arrest and deport
 the Haitians illegally living in the country. Rather than risk
 deportation back to Haiti, Haitians began to flock in large
 numbers to Florida. In addition, the brief liberalized policies of
 the INS, and especially the availability of work authorizations,
 acted as a magnet for further migration. In addition, Caribbean
 smugglers with the aid of local Haitian officials had stepped up
 their activities and were transporting large boat loads of Haitians
 to the U. S. Finally, the concentration of Haitians in a few
 counties in southern Florida strained local social and health care
 service resources. This impact, when combined with resentment
 to the granting of work authorizations for Haitians, caused some
 backlash in Florida (Copeland and Fagen, 1982).
 The INS responded to the dramatic increase in the number of
 Haitians arriving in south Florida and the backlog of asylum
 cases by cancelling the work authorizations, resuming the
 detention of Haitian males and expediting deportation hearings.
 The number of hearings increased from an average of 5 to 15 per
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 day in early 1978 to 100 to 150 a day by September 1978, with no
 more than 5 immigration judges hearing them. The few lawyers
 representing the Haitians often were scheduled to represent
 several clients whose hearings occurred simultaneously. Attor-
 neys were not allowed to speak on behalf of their clients, but
 Haitians who attempted to speak for themselves were often
 provided with inadequate translations or none at all. Following
 the initiation of the expedited procedure, the percentage of
 asylum claims denials and the numbers of Haitians being
 deported increased substantially (Lawyers Committee, 1978;
 Copeland and Fagen, 1982).
 Resort to the Courts
 Advocates of refugee rights maintained that INS practices
 undermined due process guarantees and sanctioned a pattern of
 discriminatory treatment toward asylum seekers from Haiti.
 Lawyers for the Haitians also insisted that Haitians, if returned
 home, would be subject to persecution.
 Several lawsuits were filed on behalf of the Haitians during
 1979, temporarily blocking INS deportation proceedings. In
 National Council of Churches v. INS, the plaintiffs asked for the
 names of all Haitians who had been returned to Haiti in order to
 be able to follow up on these names and possibly prove individual
 persecution. Partly in response to this lawsuit, the State Depart-
 ment sent a study team to Haiti in May 1979 to investigate charges
 that Haitian refugees were being persecuted upon their return.
 The study team reported that it had found no evidence of such
 persecution (U. S. State Department, 1979; Hooper, 1980). In
 Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, a class action suit, some 4000
 Haitians challenged the INS mass deportation policies, and in
 National Council of Churches v. Egan the plaintiffs charged that
 the INS, in revoking work authorizations for the Haitians as part
 of its expedited processing, was not following the Administrative
 Procedures Act (Copeland and Fagen, 1982; Zucker, 1983).
 In nearly every instance, the courts found for the plaintiffs. The
 most significant case was the Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti
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 in 1980. Although his decision was based on narrower legal
 grounds, Judge James Lawrence King used his opinion to refute
 the government's argument that all Haitians were economic
 migrants. He found that "much of Haiti's poverty is a result of
 Duvalier's efforts to maintain power." "The Haitians' economic
 situation," King argued, "is a political condition." He also
 discounted the report of the State Department Study Team on
 Haitian Returnees (1979) as inadequate proof for the official
 contention that Haitians were not persecuted upon return.
 Most importantly, however, Judge King found that, under the
 accelerated process, Haitian applicants were not given sufficient
 time to prepare their asylum applications, to obtain adequate
 assistance of counsel, or to state their case before an INS hearing
 office. The federal court decision in the the case of Haitian
 Refugee Center v. Civiletti concluded:
 Those Haitians who came to the United States seeking freedom
 and justice did not find it. Instead, they were confronted with an
 Immigration and Naturalization Service determined to deport
 them. The decision was made among high INS officials to expel
 Haitians, despite whatever claims to asylum individual Haitians
 might have. A Program was set up to accomplish this goal. The
 Program resulted in wholesale violations fo due process and only
 Haitians were affected.
 This Program, in its planning and executing, is offensive to every
 notion of constitutional due process and equal protection. The
 Haitians whose claims for asylum were rejected during the
 Program shall not be deported until they are given a fair chance to
 present their claims for political asylum.
 Mass Asylum and Human Rights
 Judge King's decision was handed down in July 1980, in the
 midst of a mass first asylum crisis for the U. S. during which some
 125,000 Cubans and over 11,000 Haitians arrived on American
 shores. The flow of Haitians had increased dramatically in mid
 1979, reaching its highest level in March and April 1980, just as
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 10,000 Cuban asylum-seekers arrived in the Peruvian Embassy in
 Havana. INS officials attributed this increase to the court order
 that prevented further deportation of Haitians (U.S. Congress,
 Select Commission, 1980: 18). This may well have been a factor.
 Yet it was hardly the only one. Simultaneous with this increased
 flow of Haitians to the U.S. was a rapid deterioration in the
 human rights situation in Haiti. Following the February 1979
 elections for the National Assembly, arbitrary detentions, torture,
 and harassment by the police and the tonton macoutes increased.
 The two political parties founded in 1979 by Sylvio Claude and
 Gregoire Eugene were both forced to suspend their activities and
 their leaders were arrested. A meeting of the Haitian Human
 Rights League was broken up by men armed with clubs, and its
 president and some 200 visitors, including a representative from
 the U.S. Embassy, sustained injuries (Hooper, 1980: 29-32;
 Amnesty, 1980; U.S. State Department, 1980a: 77-78; Stepick,
 1982).8 The militia, a successor to Francois Duvalier's notorious
 tonton macoutes, assumed a more prominent role, and a new
 cabinet, installed in November 1979, contained a number of
 individuals identified as hard liners and formerly associated with
 Francois Duvalier. A report on human rights in Haiti by the State
 Department released on February 5, 1980, stated: "There were no
 institutional changes favoring political liberalization, however,
 and if anything, the ability of Haitian citizens to express political
 views declined in 1979" (U.S. State Department, 1980b: 344).
 Between October and December 1980, a new wave of arrests took
 place. Virtually all Haitian human rights activists, most inde-
 pendent journalists and many lawyers active in the defense of
 political detainees and opposition leaders, were arrested or
 expelled from the country, putting an end to the already limited
 rights to freedom of assembly and expression (Lawyers Com-
 mittee, 1983).
 Despite this rapid deterioration of human rights in Haiti, the
 INS and State Department continued to regard Haitians ex-
 clusively as economic migrants, rather than as individuals
 threatened with persecution. They did so even though the
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 adoption of a new Refugee Act of 1980 clearly committed the
 United States to adhere to international legal standards and made
 asylum (or its statutory equivalent) available as a matter of right
 rather than discretion to any individual demonstrating that he or
 she was in fact a refugee. According to the INS Deputy District
 Director in Miami:
 What we're up against from our viewpoint is people who are
 fleeing an economic sitution-poverty, -low pay and lack of
 employment-coming here trying to better their way of life.
 Along the way their cause has been championed by attorneys,
 realizing that a claim to political asylum can delay things
 indeterminately.
 We depend on the State Department to advise us if political
 persecution is going on. From what we have received from the
 State Department, there is no political persecution in Haiti
 [Leapman, 1980].
 The State Department view, according to the report of the U.S.
 Coordinator of Refugee Affairs to Congress in April 1980, was
 that all Haitians entering the United States came as economic
 migrants rather than political refugees (Congressional Record,
 1980b; 53961). This view was further elaborated and modified
 somewhat by Stephen E. Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
 Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs;
 Determination of a particular asylum claim is not a general
 referendum of human rights in the home country .... Instead, we
 must apply a narrow and clearly focused standard established by
 treaty and by US statutes. The question in passing on an asylum
 application is this: Does this particular individual have a "well-
 founded fear of persecution" based on race, religion, nationality,
 membership in a particular social group or political opinion if he
 or she were to return to the home country? [U.S. Congress, House,
 1980: 207; Rivera, 1980: 300]
 Thus,
 Most of the applications we receive from Haitian nationals base
 the asylum claim solely on the fact that the applicants have
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 departed from Haiti illegally. They assert that mere departure and
 the seeking of refuge in the United States will be treated as a
 political act by the Government of Haiti and that that government
 will persecute them if they are returned. Most applications contain
 no allegation that the applicants or their families suffered
 persecution before they left or that other factors in their back-
 ground would make them suspect politically in Haiti. We do not
 believe that such applications support a finding of a well-founded
 fear of persecution, and in such cases we recommend denial of the
 application [U.S. Congress, House, 1980: 210].
 Despite the official U.S. view of arriving Haitians, events
 transpired in the spring of 1980 to force a new Haitian admissions
 policy. The combined impact of the Cuban boat lift from Mariel
 harbor, peaking in May and June, and the increased flow of
 Haitians during the spring of 1980 created a difficult situation
 nationally and especially in Florida. A number of interest groups
 humanitarian organizations, including the Congressional Black
 Caucus, complained bitterly about a system that rendered the
 asylum process for Cubans a mere formality, while using it as a
 barrier to exclude virtually every Haitian. The passage of the new
 refugee act in March, by removing all reference to Communism
 from the refugee definition law, destroyed the legal argument for
 preferring the former group from the latter. The Cuban-Haitian
 comparison sharpened political pressure and gave added force to
 a campaign, underway for months, calling for executive action to
 allow all Haitian asylum applicants then present in the U.S. to
 remain.
 President Carter for political reasons chose not to classify the
 Haitians and new Cuban arrivals as statutory refugees (Congres-
 sional Record, 1980a: 56436-56437).9 However, in the face of
 rising national public resentment against both Cubans and
 Haitians and a local crisis situation in Florida that required an
 immediate federal response, the Carter administration felt com-
 pelled to come up with a politically acceptable solution to the
 1980 mass asylum crisis. On June 20, 1980, President Carter
 issued a declaration establishing the new status of "Cuban-
 Haitian entrant" that effectively paroled into the U.S. the
 Haitians and Cubans involved in INS proceedings prior to June
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Fri, 29 Apr 2016 15:21:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 344 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
 19, 1980 (later extended to October 10, 1980). This new classifica-
 tion allowed the entrants to remain in the U.S. Initially, the
 government reimbursed the states for only 75% of certain social
 service and medical expenses and refused to fund the usual range
 of benefits made available to refugees in the U.S. In response to
 what was perceived as neglect of local impact on the part of the
 federal government, the Florida congressional delegation pressed
 through the Fascell-Stone Amendment to the Refugee Education
 Assistance Act which forced the federal government to grant
 entrant benefits equal to those of a refugee and to provide 100%
 reimbursement of state and local costs.
 The Reagan Administration and
 the Politics of Restriction
 A shift in domestic political concerns and the intensification of
 Cold War politics in the entire Caribbean Basin after the 1980
 election marked the end of the reluctant liberalization of Haitian
 admissions policy that accompanied the Mariel boat lift. Respond-
 ing to rising domestic unemployment, burgeoning budget deficits,
 and the local impact of the more than 400,000 refugees streaming
 into the U.S. during 1980, Congress became increasingly restric-
 tive and began to push for new immigration legislation. Neverthe-
 less, the influx of Haitians into the U.S. continued, and those who
 arrived after the October 10, 1980, cutoff date for Cuban-Haitian
 entrant status, were subject to exclusion. Since December 1980,
 the INS has been permitted to resume exclusion hearings for
 Haitians.
 Thus, the Reagan administration has intensified measures
 designed to curb refugee admissions. While continuing to admit a
 significant although decreasing-number of refugees making
 application from Indochina and Eastern Europe, it is taking
 concerted steps to discourage asylum-seekers from Latin America
 and the Caribbean from entering the U.S. The Haitians, along
 with Salvadorans, have borne the brunt of the new restrictive
 attitude and have been subjected to especially harsh treatment. In
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 FY 1981, for example, 503 Haitians applied for asylum and 5 were
 granted it. During the same year, only 2 Salvadorans out of 5,570
 applicants were granted political asylum in the U.S. Haitians
 have again been subjected to mass exclusion hearings and were
 the first group of asylum-seekers to be detained. Furthermore, the
 Haitians have been the only group interdicted at sea and returned
 home.
 By mid 1981, most aspects of the Haitian program were set in
 place. In May, the Reagan administration began detaining
 without the possibility of bond all Haitians subject to exclusion.
 In June, the INS resumed mass exclusion hearings, often in
 closed-door courtrooms from which attorneys were barred, and
 all Haitians applying for work authorizations were arrested by
 the INS (Zucker, 1983). When protests from the Congressional
 Black Caucus and others brought these practices to a halt, the
 INS adopted a policy of routinely detaining all arriving Haitians
 in substandard facilities, sending some to the coldest or the most
 remote parts of the United States and others to Puerto Rico
 (Hooper and Murphy, 1983).1o In these camps, Haitians were
 often denied access to legal counsel, were subjected to ha-
 rassment, and rushed throughproforma asylum hearings.
 In September 1981, the U.S. initiated a program that sought to
 circumvent the courts altogether. President Reagan signed an
 Executive Order authorizing the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept
 vessels believed to be transporting Haitians who intended to enter
 the U.S. illegally and to return them to Port-au-Prince (U.S.
 GAO Report, 1983). A Haitian Navy liaison officer was assigned
 to the Coast Guard cutter on station, and the U.S. promised to
 help train and provide the Haitian Navy and Army with the
 means to patrol their coastline in order to prevent their country-
 men from leaving. At the same time, Congress adopted legislation,
 the Fascell-Mica-Chiles Amendment (Section 721) to the Interna-
 tional Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981,
 linking Haitian cooperation in stopping illegal emigration,
 implementing development programs, and respecting its citizens'
 human rights to the release of U.S. foreign assistance funds to
 Haiti. By October 1981, the first Coast Guard cutter was plying
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 Haitian waters. Aboard was an INS officer who, in proceedings
 termed "walrus courts" by The New York Times, (New York
 Times, 1981) heard the claims of Haitians who alleged political
 persecution and returned them to Haitian authorities.
 The second major aspect of the Reagan program to deal with-
 the Haitians involved the submission to Congress of the Administra-
 tion's 1981 Omnibus Immigration Control Act. This legislative
 package proposed, among other things, greater autonomy for the
 INS in determining when' an applicant's fear of persecution is
 justified, and would have deprived the federal courts of any
 oversight over that determination. In addition to limiting judicial
 review, the Reagan proposals provided for detention, the restric-
 tion of the role of counsel, and authorization in law of interdiction
 of foreign vessels on the high seas suspected of smuggling aliens,
 even in the absence of consent from their country of origin.
 Although Congress submitted its own immigration proposal in
 the form of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, the thrust of U.S.
 remains-to prevent asylum-seekers from reaching the borders of
 the United States, to detain under misearable conditions those
 who do manage to reach those borders, and to expedite the latter
 group's return.
 Undoubtedly, the policy to discourage the granting of asylum
 has been predicated primarily on a broader commitment to
 immigration control, and to fears that large numbers of Carib-
 bean Basin nationals will continue to enter the United States
 illegally, using the asylum process to avoid exclusion or deporta-
 tion. Yet, Cubans continue to receive favorable treatment. In
 February 1984, the White House was reported to be offering
 permanent residence status to the 125,000 Mariel Cubans but not
 to the 7,200 Haitians who also arrived in 1980, and corrective
 legislation needed to be introduced by Peter Rodino, Chairman
 of the House Judiciary Committee (New York Times, 1984a).
 Current refugee and asylum policy is also the result of
 ideological priorities of the Reagan administration. It is not a
 coincidence that Poles but not Haitians have been granted
 extended voluntary departure status. Administration officials
 have asserted that it is in the national interest to support
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 authoritarian allies in order to contain totalitarian adversaries. In
 June 1982, Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for
 Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, relied implicitly on the
 authoritarian/totalitarian distinction to explain why Cubans are
 refugees and should continue to be welcome in the United States
 while Haitians should be turned away at the border or interdicted
 at sea (Abrams, 1982: 43-45).
 Root Causes and Haitian Emigration
 An asylum policy that proceeds from preconceived ideological
 biases and seeks to control immigration flow without looking into
 underlying causes is shortsighted. In the long run the only
 effective way of reducing the flow of Haitians to the U.S. is to
 address concretely the conditions that create refugees (Scanlan
 and Loescher, 1982: 39-56). During the Reagan administration,
 violations of human rights under Jean-Claude Duvalier-have
 continued unabated and have been documented by numerous
 human rights organizations (Gastil, 1982; OAS, 1983; Amnesty,
 1981; and 1982; Lawyers Committee, 1983). In fact, the human
 rights record of Haiti is regarded by Freedom House in New York
 as even worse than Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba (Gastil, 1982:
 282, 299).
 Despite Haiti's abysmal record, the prospects for a forceful
 human rights policy under the Reagan administration seem
 rather poor. Toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Reagan
 is motivated by his intention to defend the security interests of the
 U.S. and by expression of concern about the Marxist threat in
 Nicaragua and El Salvador, and, in particular, by Cuba's efforts
 to export revolution in the region. This has resulted, among other
 things, in the U.S. resuming a policy of nearly unrestricted arms
 sales to governments in the area regardless of their human rights
 violations. In order to carry out this policy, the U.S. State
 Department has had to underplay the extent of human rights
 violations among its aid recipients (Hooper, 1981; Americas
 Watch, 1982; 1983).1" In regard to Haiti, human rights reporting
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 has played down human rights abuses in order to certify Haiti
 for more U.S. aid and to justify the State Department/INS
 position that hardly any Haitians are worthy of political asylum
 (U.S. Department of State, 1982; New York Times, 1984b).'2
 U.S. policy toward Haiti under Reagan is based on the
 maintenance of friendly relations with the noncommunist Du-
 valier government. To this end, the U.S. has encouraged increases
 in foreign economic aid from multilateral and bilateral sources.
 The U.S. has, for example, intervened on behalf of Haiti with the
 international financial institutions and with other bilateral donors
 to obtain further economic assistance for Haiti. International
 assistance has been granted by the World Bank, the United
 Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Develop-
 ment Bank, the Organization of American States, and the
 International Monetary Fund. U.S. bilateral assistance to Haiti,
 totalled $34 million in FY1981, $37 million in FY1982, and is
 programmed for $38.8 million for FY1983 (McPherson, 1982).
 Most of the PL 480 food grants and some development projects
 are channeled through private voluntary agencies, including
 CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and Church World Service. The
 personnel of most major aid programs, including those ad-
 ministered by the voluntary agencies, complain of governmental
 corruption and significant diversion of aid.
 A major purpose of the recent increases in the U.S. aid
 program is to bring the problem of Haitian emigration under
 control. Based on the assumption that most Haitians emigrate to
 find jobs, AID and other external donors have argued that the
 Haitian economy has to provide more employment and make life
 more bearable in the rural areas in order to reduce the pressures to
 emigrate. According to McPherson:
 The pressure to migrate will continue as long as the countryside
 lacks employment opportunities and even the most rudimentary
 services in health, education and public services. Job creation,
 therefore, must continue to be one of the economy's prime aims
 [McPherson, 1982].
 The success of this or any other development program in Haiti,
 however, is dependent on the ability of the U.S. in concert with
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 other bilateral and multilateral donors and the Haitian govern-
 ment, to come to grips with the problems of incompetence, self-
 interest, and corruption currently rife in Haitian society. To date,
 development efforts in Haiti have been singularly unsuccessful
 due to pervasive governmental corruption and insensitivity to the
 plight of the average Haitian (Lundahl, 1979; Miami Herald,
 1982). According to a 1982 report of the General Accounting
 Office, the AID program objectives of strengthening the Haitian
 government's commitment to equitable economic and social
 development programs have had only "limited ability to impact
 on Haiti's dire poverty, and many projects have had less than
 satisfactory results" (U.S. GAO Report, 1982: 6)13 The report
 further states that "AID's current program will not likely result in
 a fundamental turnaround to Haiti's dire economic condition,
 nor will it substantially alter the economic factors encouraging
 emigration" (U.S. GAO Report, 1982).
 Rather, the continued neglect of the rural areas suggests that
 pressures for the displacement of peasants from the countryside
 will intensify and that large-scale rural-urban migration may be
 the result. These pressures will, in turn, be exacerbated by the
 Reagan administration's temporarily successful efforts to curb
 illegal Haitian emigration to the U.S. The danger is that the
 closing of Haiti's traditional "safety valve" of out-migration may
 well result in increased immigration to Port-au-Prince, which is
 already overcrowded and cannot respond to a massive influx of
 more people. Thus, the probability of internal political unrest,
 persecution, and more out-migration in spite of enforcement
 efforts is great, and the U.S. should be prepared for a possible
 mass asylum crisis involving Haitians in the future.
 To date, U.S. admissions practices toward asylum applicants
 from Haiti have been influenced by political conditions having
 much to do with foreign relations and fears of uncontrolled illegal
 immigration and little to do with probable persecution, consider-
 ations of humanity, and due process. Haiti is still regarded as a
 defender of U.S. interests in the region. Yet political support for
 repressive and unpopular regimes is bad foreign policy, since such
 regimes are inherently less stable and inevitably produce large
 numbers of refugees. There are no easy solutions to the problems
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 plaguing Haiti. Nor are there easy solutions to economic
 pressures driving people from every country in the region toward
 the U.S. Yet a government less corrupt than the present Haitian
 regime, and one that addressed the roots of rural poverty and
 respected human rights, would be better able to curb the massive
 outflow of Haitians to the U.S. The U.S. is in a position to exert
 leverage on the Duvalier regime for considerable improvement in
 its human rights practices and financial accountability for aid.
 Haiti is in a desperate economic situation and will continue to rely
 on large infusions of external aid for the foreseeable future. It is
 essential that aid be directed to basic needs and focus on the
 peasants, which is not the case at present.
 At the same time, in confronting the myriad problems posed by
 mass asylum, the United States should not lose sight of the fact
 that political asylum was created for humanitarian reasons to
 help carefully defined groups. It may be that a substantial number
 of Haitians are not refugees under the international standard set
 out in the Refugee Act of 1980. Many of the Haitians, however,
 will be bonafide refugees. If the United States is serious about
 human rights in Haiti, it must be willing to offer the hope of
 protection for those Haitians with the courage to begin the
 democratization process there. The U.S. must not let its legitimate
 concern for controlling its borders interfere with its obligation to
 let those who are refugees into the country. The means should be
 developed to make the U.S. asylum system more efficient within
 the context of international and constitutional obligations and
 constitutional obligations and American humanitarian ideals,
 and to ensure that it does not prevent or circumvent the process
 altogether for political reasons.
 NOTES
 1. U.S. AID describes the role of the Haitian government as follows:
 Throughout much of Haiti's history, "government" has been a prize to capture,
 with the victor gaining the spoils in terms of appointing friends and relatives to the
 payroll and using government positions for private profit ... Haiti does not have a
 tradition of government as a servant of the people.
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 2. The background on the legal status and programs for Cubans is given in Moore
 (1980).
 3. In a letter to President Eisenhower on October 8, 1959, Duvalier concluded:
 Last week, I was advised by the Charge d'Affairs ad Interim that "although the
 United States has concluded there is no present or anticipated requirement for a
 permanent military installation in Haiti, it would be useful to have access to sites
 suitable for amphibious training."
 I can say without reservation that any sites required by the United States for
 amphibious training will be made available immediately. Also, if United States
 military survey teams will be sent to Haiti for determining the locations for such
 sites, they will have placed at their disposal all of the information, facilities and
 assistance that they may require.
 In view of the continual worsening of conditions throughout the world, my offer to
 the United States of American concerning the availability of sites for military or
 missile installations, as well as for missile tracking stations remains unchanged.
 Mr. President, you have my best wishes for continued success in your enormous
 task of maintaining world peace. I wish to assure you again that, in the United
 Nations, the Republic of Haiti will continue to vote with and support the policies of
 the United States of America.
 4. The chiefs of the U.S. military missions in Haiti were present at the inauguration
 ceremonies, however, and sitting in Port-au-Prince harbor was a U.S. ship bearing arms
 for the Haitian army.
 5. It was reported in the New York Times that the CIA (Central Intelligency Agency)
 "collaborated with Haitian leaders of a group of at least 200 rebels" who tried
 unsuccessfully to overthrow Duvalier in 1963 (1975b).
 6. The International Rescue Committee reported that although diplomatic relations
 between Haiti and the Domincian Republic had been severed in April 1963 about 5000
 persons had escaped from Haiti to the Dominican Republic between May and December
 1983.
 7. According to one authority, "This fact of security also affects the peasant freehold
 farmers who rarely have clear title. There are substantiated reports of land grabs, of judges
 bribed to issue competing land titles, and of extortion by locally powerful quasi-
 governmental authorities. Facing the very real possibility of appropriation of their land by
 gross neg (big shots), farmers are also discouraged from investing in their land and
 encouraged to overwork it" (Maguire, 1981).
 8. Apparently the Haitian government has never conducted an inquiry into this
 incident, and no one has been charged with any crimes in connection with the violent
 actions of these security forces.
 9. Such a course had been recommended by Senator Edward Kennedy, Carter's
 principal opponent for the 1980 Democratic nomination, in a 20 May, 1980 letter to
 President Carter.
 10. Although federal efforts to establish illegal alien detention centers at Fort Drum,
 New York, and Glasgow, Montana, were deferred under widespread criticism, as of
 March 1982 over 250 Haitians were detained at northern sites run by the Bureau of Prisons
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 in Otisville and Raybrook, New York, and 778 were at Fort Allen, Puerto Rico (U.S. INS
 Statistical Report, 1982).
 11. This report concluded that the State Department distorted its human righs
 reporting for foreign policy reasons. It reads, in part:
 Though most of the work in compiling the Country Reports has been carried on
 responsibly and effectively by the Department-of State, political biases are evident
 in some of the reports. There is no general overstatement of human rights abuses in
 countries with which United States relations are not friendly. Nor is there any
 general understatement of abuses in countries friendly to the United States.
 Rather, distortions in the reporting seem to reflect efforts to further political ends
 relating to the particular countries.
 Among the most serious distortions we noted are contained in the reports of El
 Salvador and Haiti.
 In the case of El Salvador, ... (in) an apparent effort to make certain that the
 Country Reports do not undermine the Reagan administration's program of
 providing military aid to El Salvador ... the Country Reports systematically
 attempts to absolve the government of El Salvador and the high command of the
 military of responsibility for abuses of human rights committed by the security
 forces.
 In the case of Haiti, the report . . . grossly understates the seriousness of human
 rights abuses, apparently in an effort to undercut claims for asylum by Haitian
 refugees in the United States.
 12. The State Department has been required by Section 721 of the International
 Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 to report on human rights conditions
 in Haiti on an annual basis. Since 1982, it has reported that the Haitian Government is not
 engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
 rights.
 13. The most obvious examples of the Haitian government's insensitivity to the fate of
 its own citizens has been the uncooperative response it gave to two recent AID (Agency for
 International Development) programs targeted for human rights and' basic needs.
 According to the GAO (U.S. Government Accounting Office) report (1982):
 The project for legal assistance to the poor was to begin in 1979. The primary
 purpose was to assist the Port-au-Prince Bar Association in establishing a system
 for free legal services to indigent Haitians accused of crimes. A secondary purpose
 was to strengthen the Bar Association by supporting its role as a trainer of new
 lawyers. Haitian support for this project never materialized. AID deobligated this
 project before the end of the fiscal year 1981. The project for agricultural research
 was to begin in 1978. The purpose of this project was to establish in the Ministry of
 Agriculture the institutional ability to conduct agricultural research and statistics
 surveys to support the Haitian small farmer agricultural/rural development
 program. As of October 1981 the project still had not begun. The Haiti AID
 Mission Director is now reprogramming the project with the Ministry and expects
 to initiate activities by June 1982. If progress is not satisfactory by then, he plans to
 deobligate the project before the end of fiscal year 1982.
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Fri, 29 Apr 2016 15:21:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Loescher, Scanlan / RIGHTS, POLICY, AND HAITIAN REFUGEES 353
 REFERENCES
 ABRAMS, E. (1982) "Human Rights and the Refugee Crisis." U.S. State Department
 Bull. (September): 4345.
 American Federation of Labor/Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL/ CIO) (1974)
 AFL/ CIO News. 3 August.
 Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch, and the Lawyers' Committee for International Human
 Rights (1983) Review of the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights
 Practices for 1982. February.
 ---(1982) A Critique of the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights
 for 1981. April.
 Amnesty International (Al) (1983) Annual Report.
 ---(1982) Annual Report.
 ---(1981) Haiti Human Rights Violations: October 1980 - October 1981. November.
 ---(1980) Annual Report.
 ---(1975-76) Annual Report.
 ---(1973) Report. 1 March.
 BOSWELL, T. (1983) "In the Eye of the Storm: the context of Haitian migration to
 Miami, Flordia." Southeastern Georgrapher 23, 2 (November): 53-57.
 ---(1982) "The New Haitian diaspora." Caribbean Review 11, 1 (Winter): 18.
 Congressional Record (1980a) 126 (26 June): 56436-56437.
 ---(1980b) 126 (21 April): 53961.
 COPELAND, R. and P. W. FAGEN (1982) Political Asylum: A Background Paper on
 Concepts, Procedures and Problems. Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group
 (December).
 DIEDERICH, B. and A. BURT (1969) Papa Doc: The Truth About Haiti Today. New
 York: McGraw-Hill.
 DOMINGUEZ, V. (1975) From Neighbor to Stranger: The Dilemma of the Caribbean
 Peoples in the United States. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
 DUVALIER, F. (1959) Letter from the President of Haiti to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 8
 October. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, International Series, Bpx 25, Folder "Haiti"
 (6).
 GASTIL, R. (1982) Freedom in the World 1982. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
 HANSON, C. (1978) "Behind the paper curtain: asylum policy versus asylum practice."
 NYU Rev. of Law and Social Change 7, 1 (Winter): 107-141.
 HEINL, R. and N. HEINL. (1978) Written in Blood: the Story of the Haitian People.
 Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
 HERTER, C. (1958) Memorandum for the President. U.S. Dept. of State, 7 August.
 Hispanic American Report (1964a) 17, 9: 8040805.
 ---(1964b) 16, 11 (January): 1061.
 ---(1961) 14, 7 (September): 607.
 HOOPER, M. and M. MURPHY (1983) Interview with Directors of National Emergency
 Practices in Haiti for 1980. Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights.
 May.
 ---(1980) Violations of Human Rights in Haiti. Lawyers' Committee for International
 Human Rights.
 HOOPER, M. and M. MURPHY (1983) Interview wit Directors of National Emergency
 Coalition for Haitians by the authors. New York City. April and November. Inter-
 American Commission for Human Rights (IAHRC) (1980) Report on Haiti. April.
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Fri, 29 Apr 2016 15:21:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 354 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (1958-1980) Economic and Social Progress in
 Latin America. Issued annually.
 International Commission of Jurists (1967) Bulletin 31: 28-33.
 ---(1966) Bulletin 25: 1-5.
 ---(1963) Bulletin 17: 19-25.
 Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights (1982) A Report to the OAS
 (Organization of American States): Violations of Human Rights in Haiti, June 1981 -
 September 1982.
 Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights and the Alien Rights Project of the
 Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law (1978) The Haitians in Miami:
 Current Immigratin Practices in the U.S. December.
 Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights, Americas Watch Committee, and
 International League for Human Rights (1983) Haiti: Report of Human Rights
 Mission, June 26-29, 1983. August.
 LEAPMAN, M. (1980) "Haiti boat people are America's newest problem." London
 Times, March 12.
 LICHTENBERG, J. (1982) Persecution vs. Poverty: Are the Haitians Refugees? College
 Park, MD: Center for Philosophy and Public Policy. Spring.
 LUNDAHL, M. (1979) Peasants and Poverty: A Study of Haiti. London: Croom-Helm.
 MAGUIRE, R. (1981) Bottom-up Development in Haiti. Rosslyn, VA: Inter-American
 Foundation. April.
 MANIGAT, L. (1964) Haiti of the Sixties. Washington, DC: Center of foreign Policy
 Research.
 MARTIN, E. (1963) "Interdependence and the principles of self-determination." U.S.
 Department of State Bull. 48, 1245 (6 May): 711.
 McPHERSON, M. (1982) Copy of a statement made before the U.S. Congress, House
 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. 21 April.
 Miami Herald (1982) "Haiti: foreign aid gone awry." December 19 and 20.
 MOORE, C. (1980) Refugees in the United States: The Cuban Emigration Crisis.
 Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. 9 July.
 New York Times (1984a) February 13.
 ---(1984b) February 5.
 ---(198 1) July 16.
 ---(1977) September 1.
 ---(1976) October 17.
 ---(1975a) November 21.
 ---(1975b) March 10.
 ---(1970) February 27.
 ---(1969a) July 3.
 --(1969b) June 3.
 ---(1969c) March 13.
 ---(1968a) March 30.
 ---(1968b) February 29.
 ---(1967) January 3.
 ---(1963) May 8.
 ---(1959a) March 8.
 ---(1959b) February 28.
 ---(1958a) November 26.
 ---(1958b) August 16.
 ---(1958c) July 30.
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Fri, 29 Apr 2016 15:21:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Loescher, Scanlan / RIGHTS, POLICY, AND HAITIAN REFUGEES 355
 ---(1958d) July 10.
 ---(1958e) June 12.
 ---(1958f) June 8.
 ---(1958g) May 8.
 ---(1958h) May 7.
 ---(1957a) September 29.
 ---(1957b) August 21.
 Organization of American States (OAS) (1983) Annual Report of the Inter-American
 Commission on Human Rights, 1982-1983. Washington, DC: OAS General
 Secretariat.
 ---(1973) Resolution in Case 1716, Haiti. 24 April.
 RIVERA, M. (1980) The Cuban and Haitian Influxes of 1980 and the American
 Response: Retrospect and Prospect. Report of the Cuban/ Haitian Task Force of the
 U.S. Department of State.
 ROBERTS, R. (1978) Impediments to Economic and Social Change in Haiti. Washington,
 DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. 19 July.
 ROTBERG, R. (1971) Haiti: The Politics of Squalor. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
 SCANLAN, J. and G. LOESCHER (1983) "U.S. foreign policy, 1959-80: impact on
 refugee flow from Cuba." Annals of the Amer. Academy of Pol. and Social Sci. 467
 (May): 116-137.-
 ---(1982) "Mass asylum and human rights in American foreign policy." Pol. Sci. Q.
 97, 1 (Spring): 39-56.
 SCHLESINGER, A., Jr. (1965) A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy at the White House.
 Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
 SCHMIDT, H. (1971) The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1916-1934. New
 Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press.
 SCHOULTZ, L. (1981) Human Rights and U.S. Policy Towards Latin America.
 Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
 SEGAL, A. (1975) "Haiti," pp. 197-204 in A. Segal (ed.) Population Patterns in the
 Caribbean. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
 STEPICK, A. (1982) Haitian Refugees in the U.S. Minority Rights Group Report 52
 (January).
 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) Number 2545, 189 UNTS
 (U.N. Treaty Series) 137, Article IA (1) 28 July.
 U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) (1977) Development Assistance
 Program, FY 1979. June.
 U.S. Congress, House. Judiciary Committee (1980) Subcommittee on Immigration,
 Refugees, and International Law. "Caribbean Migration." 96th Congress, 2nd session.
 June.
 ---(1976) Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law.
 "Haitian immigration." 94th Congress, 2nd session. July.
 U.S. Congress, House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on
 International Organizations (1976) "Human rights in Haiti." 94th Congress, 1st
 session. 18 November.
 U.S. Congress. Joint Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. (1980)
 Miami Regional Hearing. Unpublished.
 U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Appropriations. (1977) "Review of factors affecting
 U.S. diplomatic and assistance relations with Haiti." 95th Congress, 2nd session.
 November.
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Fri, 29 Apr 2016 15:21:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 356 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
 ---(1974) "U.S. foreign assistance for Haiti," Report 93-620. 93rd Congress, 2nd
 session. July.
 U.S. Congress, Senate. Judiciary Committee (1974) Subcommittee to Investigate
 Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees. "Refugee and Humanitarian
 problems in Chile, PART II." 93rd Congress, 2nd session. July.
 U.S. Department of State (1982) Action Memorandum: Report to Congress on Haiti. 30
 June.
 ---(1980) Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979. Washington, DC:
 Government Printing Office (15 Februray): 341.
 ---(1979) Memorandum: State Department Study Team on Haitian Returnees. 19
 June.
 ---(1978) Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1977. Washington, DC:
 Government Printing Office (3 February): 172-176.
 ---(1960) "Responsibility of Cuban government for increased international tensions
 in the hemisphere." Department of State Bull. 43, 1105 (29 August): 340-341.
 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (1983) GAO Report-Detention Policies
 Affecting Haitian Nationals (16 June).
 ---(1982) GAO Report-Assistance to Haiti: Barriers, Recent Program Changes and
 Future Options (22 February).
 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (1982) Statistical Report. Wash-
 ington, DC: INS. February.
 Washington Post (1977) August 16: A-1, A-12.
 WEIL, T. (1973) Area Handbook for Haiti. Washington, DC: Government Printing
 Office: 124 and 145-46.
 World Bank (1981) Memorandum on the Haitian Economy (13 May).
 ZUCKER, N. (1983) "The Haitians vs. the U.S.: the courts as last resort." Annals of the
 Amer. Academy of Pol. and Social Sci. 467 (May): 151-162.
 Gilburt Loescher is Assistant Professor, Department of Government and Interna-
 tional Studies, at the University of Notre Dame. John Scanlan is a member of the
 Indiana University Law Schoolfaculty at Bloomington. They are coeditors of The
 Global Refugee Problem: U. S. and World Response (1983), and they are currently
 writing a book on U.S. refugee admissions policy under a grant from the Ford
 Foundation.
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Fri, 29 Apr 2016 15:21:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
